Clarify Windows validation evidence

docs/operations/BACKUP.md

@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ VPS, even temporarily. The reviewed implementation in PR #59 streams stopped
 Compose state directly from the root receiver to the owner's Windows client;
 the client stores it only under `D:\Dev\akyldash\.backups`. The VPS retains
 only a secret-free identity (backup ID, size, archive and manifest hashes,
-manifest) in root-owned release state. The implementation has synthetic tests
-only and is not installed or verified on Windows or the VPS. There is no
-verified production backup, so production deployment remains blocked.
+manifest) in root-owned release state. The Windows rerun passed 12 synthetic
+client checks, 8 protocol checks, and a disposable real-NTFS private owner-ACL
+fixture. The production D: path, SSH connection, VPS installation, and
+full production backup remain unverified. There is no verified production
+backup, so production deployment remains blocked.
 
 ## External backup flow
 
@@ -39,10 +41,11 @@ verified production backup, so production deployment remains blocked.
   references. It restores images only, never application data or OpenSearch
   state.
 
-Windows PowerShell is the intended client. The destination and ACL checks have
-not yet been exercised on Windows. An owner must separately test archive
-restore on an isolated target before relying on this path. Do not restore over
-production as a test.
+Windows PowerShell is the intended client. The Windows checks exercised the
+destination and ACL rules, including a disposable real-NTFS private owner-ACL
+fixture. The actual production D: destination and SSH path remain unverified.
+An owner must separately test archive restore on an isolated target before
+relying on this path. Do not restore over production as a test.
 
 ## Backup contents and limits
 

docs/operations/CURRENT_STATE.md

@@ -4,9 +4,12 @@ Owner decision recorded 2026-10-26: a complete backup must not be stored on
 the VPS, including temporarily. The local archive/full cold-backup commands in
 `BACKUP.md` are superseded and unauthorized. PR #59 now contains a proposed
 Windows-controlled external stream receiver and root-side deploy/rollback
-code. It has not been installed or run on Windows or the VPS. No verified
-external backup or separate-target restore exists, so production deployment
-remains blocked by the backup gate.
+code. The Windows rerun passed 12 synthetic client checks and 8 protocol
+checks, plus a disposable real-NTFS fixture for the private owner ACL. The
+production D: path, SSH connection, VPS installation, full backup, and
+separate-target restore remain unverified. No verified external backup or
+separate-target restore exists, so production deployment remains blocked by
+the backup gate.
 
 ## Code-only deployment work — 2026-10-31
 
@@ -28,16 +31,19 @@ remains blocked by the backup gate.
   durable pending journal before stopping services, and reject an already
   applied release before downtime. The Windows client checks D: capacity,
   NTFS/path/ACL owner and allowed entries, and the local ignore rule before
-  SSH; it requires 100 GiB plus 1 MiB free. These code changes remain
-  unverified on Windows and the VPS.
+  SSH; it requires 100 GiB plus 1 MiB free. The Windows rerun passed 12
+  synthetic client checks, 8 protocol checks, and a disposable real-NTFS
+  private owner-ACL fixture; actual D:, SSH, and VPS remain unverified.
 - Receiver cleanup after a post-publication ACL failure is identity-bound to
   the owned staging directory and permits only the expected archive files. A
   replaced, reparse, or unexpected target is left for manual review without an
-  ACK; this path is covered by local fixtures and remains pending Windows rerun.
+  ACK; this path is covered by local fixtures and the Windows rerun.
 - Synthetic tests cover archive/protocol integrity, helper download rules,
   artifact/run provenance, receiver publication, release schema, and rollback
-  refusal. Windows ACL, NTFS, PowerShell, SSH alias, Gitea helper against the
-  live instance, root helper installation, artifact redirect, production
+  refusal. The 12 synthetic Windows client checks, 8 protocol checks, and
+  disposable real-NTFS private owner-ACL fixture passed. The actual D: path,
+  SSH alias, Gitea helper against
+  the live instance, root helper installation, artifact redirect, production
   backup/restore, and actual release/rollback remain unverified.
 - Owner bootstrap blockers remain: verify a root-controlled SSH route for the
   fixed commands using existing host-key checking; provision only the

docs/operations/DEPLOYMENT_OWNER_PACKET.md

@@ -47,8 +47,9 @@ private keys, secret material, or raw process environments.
 
 - The complete archive must remain on the owner-controlled Windows destination
   `D:\Dev\akyldash\.backups`; never stage a full archive on the VPS.
-- Before relying on the flow, run its NTFS, ACL, D: path, and local `.git/info/exclude`
-  checks on Windows and verify a complete synthetic or approved backup is
+- Synthetic Windows protocol checks and a disposable private-NTFS owner-ACL
+  fixture passed. Before relying on the flow, run its checks against the actual
+  D: path and local `.git/info/exclude`, then verify an approved backup is
   published only after hash and manifest verification.
 - Confirm D: encryption at rest. Archives contain production secrets and
   private keys; the protocol encrypts transport but does not encrypt files at
@@ -62,6 +63,9 @@ private keys, secret material, or raw process environments.
   throughout the rollback window.
 
 The installer does not create credentials, SSH configuration, canary values,
-registry access, or new sudo rules. The PR has not been installed, run on
-Windows, or executed against production. Keep deployment disabled until the
-owner records evidence for each gate above.
+registry access, or new sudo rules. The PR has not been installed or run
+against production. Windows validation passed 12 synthetic client checks, 8
+protocol checks, and a disposable real-NTFS private owner-ACL fixture. The
+actual D: path, SSH, full backup, and separate-target restore remain
+unverified. Keep deployment disabled until the owner records evidence for
+each gate above.